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ARTICLE I.

PRACTICABLE OBJECTS OF PEACE SOCIETIES.

BY THE EDITOR.

ONE of the rules laid down by Grotius, is, "War should never be declared until all other means of redress have been faithfully tried; nor then, unless the conditions of peace are more rigorous and severe than war itself."—Is it certainly known that all other means of redress are appreciated and employed, so that this rule is truly obeyed? Has the efficacy of reason and law as a means of settling international disputes been fully investigated? Is it the general practice of nations to employ them in cases where they would be effective? Is it generally regarded compatible with the honor of a nation, to manifest a spirit of forbearance, and to try the virtue of the rule which requires us to overcome evil with good? The inflamed passion,—the menacing resolutions and despatches,—the diplomatic fire kept up with such gallantry and spirit—all which we witness on occasions of national differences—seem to answer, No. Something *practicable*, then, in the way of promoting peace, remains to be done, either to illustrate the rule or to induce obedience to it; otherwise the rule is absurd.

The other clause of the rule, "nor then, unless the conditions

of peace are more rigorous and severe than war itself," must not be passed over without consideration. How shall it be determined whether or not the case falls within the rule? Plainly, the conditions of peace and war must be set in contrast—they must be weighed in opposite scales. In no other mode can their comparative rigor and severity be estimated. But what are the conditions of peace and war? Among the conditions of war are, loss of life* to immense numbers falling by each other's hand, or victims of disease, hunger, climate, or of any other evil to which they may have been subjected through the influence of war—fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, wives, children, left to pine away in desolation, or to perish with want. Add to these conditions, cities pillaged and set on fire—fields waving with the products of industry desolated—monuments of art demolished—repositories of learning and science, with their treasures, burnt—innocence violated, and crime committed with impunity. Add again, monies expended†—peaceful pursuits interrupted—powers, both of body and mind, wasted. Add, again, character of the combatants corrupted—public morals degraded—civil government in jeopardy—*spirit* of the gospel, if not its express precepts, opposed—progress of Christianity obstructed—and above all these conditions of war, and embracing them all, its effect upon the eternal destinies of men. But who shall recount the conditions of war? *Non mihi si ferrea vox, centum linguæ—*

* "Est Dicæarchi liber de interitu hominum, Peripatetici magni et copiosi: qui collectis ceteris caussis, eluvionis, pestilentiae, vastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quædam hominum genera esse consumpta: deinde comparat, quanto plures deleti sunt homines hominum impetu, id est, bellis aut seditionibus, quam omni reliqua calamitate.

[There is extant a book of Dicæarchus, a distinguished Peripatetic, in which, having enumerated other causes, viz., inundations, pestilence, devastation, wild beasts by whose sudden attacks in multitudes, he says that some races of men have been destroyed, he afterwards shows how many more men have been destroyed by men, that is, by wars and seditions, than by every other calamity.]—*Cic. de Officiis.*

† The remark of Cicero in regard to the public revenue might be much extended in its application. "Sæpe totius anni fructus uno rumore periculi, atque uno belli terrore amittitur." Often the revenue of a whole year is lost by one rumor of danger and one alarm of war.—*Oratio pro lege Manilia.*

For the conditions of peace, reverse the picture :—life, person and property, secure—industry and the arts flourishing—science unmolested—morals untouched—the civil authority predominant—spirit of the gospel having free course—the Christian religion rising with its benignant light upon the nations—and the influence of all these conditions in preparing man for his eternal abode.—To exhibit the subject of peace and war in this manner, is a *practicable* thing, and is one of the objects of Peace Societies. The effect, it cannot be doubted, must be to set men's minds against war, and to incline their hearts to peace.

The *necessity* of such a mode of redress as war, implied by the rule of Grotius, is not to be conceded without examination.—Good laws well administered are competent to afford all attainable security against encroachments upon the rights either of persons or of property. A necessity of resort to force by individuals, for obtaining redress, implies not a *state of society*, but a *condition of mankind*, like that imagined to have existed antecedent to the formation of the civil compact, when every man ranged at will,—independent of every other man, and relying for protection on nothing but his own arm. This idea of men living at first in a state of nature, as it is termed, and at length by consent entering into a state of society, each one yielding up a portion of his natural rights and liberties to the community, and the community in turn covenanting to afford him that protection which before he was obliged to seek for himself—every one who knows any thing of the subject, knows to be a fiction. Such a fiction expresses what would be the condition of men without society, thus showing the *objects* of society. Hence it has been found convenient to deduce from it the rights and duties of men as citizens. There is indeed one period of the world in which this state of nature seems to have been reality, every man living without restraint of law. It was the age of physical might. There were giants on the earth in those days; the earth was filled with violence. To such a degree were these natural liberties of man extended, that the interposition of the Deity seems to have been required

to prevent the utter extinction of the race. Towards such a state of things there has always been a tendency wherever individuals have taken the law into their own hands, and relied upon themselves for protection.

It may, however, be said that there are injuries for which law can afford no redress; as, for example, the injury of insult. In regard to human law, the assertion is true. There are injuries of a nature too indefinable to be the subject of human law. They must be left to that law which embraces in the perfection of its operation even the thoughts and intents of the heart. If such injuries require a discrimination keener than that of the perfection of human reason, and an evidence more exact than that which is available in a court of justice, and a discernment more perfect than belongs to the judge, how much less are they fit subjects for the adjudication of an incensed individual—law, evidence, and judge, in his own cause! Individuals, then, must look to the law for redress, and where that fails to afford it, they cannot obtain it.

The case of nations may be said to be different. It may be asserted that nations are individuals with natural rights, independent of each other, and that they must necessarily rely each on itself for protection. This is not true. Nations are members of a compact corresponding to the civil law—the law of nations. This idea of protection without law would not do, even here. All civilized nations regard as binding upon them in their intercourse with each other a system of rules founded in natural reason or adopted by express consent. But, it will be said, the ultimate resort when these laws are broken, as in the case of civil law, must be to force. There is no other mode by which they can be sustained. Hence war is necessary. We admit the position laid down, but deny the inference. Why, for the wrong done by a few, fall upon a whole nation indiscriminately? If individuals in civil society can form laws, establish courts for their interpretation, and for the trial of offenders, and sustain a sufficient physical force to put their laws in execution, may not nations do the same? The difficulties may be greater than in the case of civil society,

because the machinery would be more complicated : but is there for all this, in the nature of the case, any *inherent* impracticability? We think it not more impracticable at least, than for nations to obtain redress by measuring military strength, and contending which shall do the other the most injury.

Let not the idea of war as a *penalty* come up here. Regard it rather as a mode of making the weak to tremble with terror of the strong. When we hear war declared to be a penalty analogous to the penalties of civil law, we think of the tragedy of Gaza. The avengers and those who suffer at their hand, lie buried under the ruins in indiscriminate slaughter. "So the dead which he slew at his death, are more than they which he slew in his life."—To point out a process for interpreting, applying, and sustaining, international law, analogous to that of civil jurisprudence, is a great object; and if not an object of *inherent* impracticability, it is a fit object to employ the labors of those who associate themselves together for promoting peace.

The other rule of Grotius is, "War may be declared, when necessary for self-preservation." It is asserted that a nation which should discard war and rely upon other means for self-preservation, would be the subject of insult and aggression, and finally fall a victim to violence; hence it is not practicable for one nation to do any thing in the way of abolishing war so long as other nations persist in sustaining it. What then? Is war to endure forever? Oh no! the time will come, (the answer must be) when all nations by simultaneous consent shall agree to abolish it, and then the reign of peace will begin. Grant, since you desire it, this anomaly in the philosophy of mind, this unheard of thing in the history of human improvement. Will you also ask us to grant another anomaly, that it is to be the effect of miracle, and not of appropriate truth? If we concede this point also, we must admit that peace societies have no practicable object. But suppose that the nations of Europe and the United States should adopt among the rules of their intercourse with each other the "prin-

ciple that no appeal should in any case be made to arms until all efforts to procure an impartial arbitration had failed; ** suppose the powers of Europe should consent to disband their armies, comprising six millions of men, (gradually, if you will,) and to appropriate the monies now expended for their support, to the education and moral improvement of the people; who can fail to perceive the advancement which, as physical force should thus be discarded and moral force put in requisition, would be made towards a state of universal and permanent peace? The system perpetuates the system, the necessity perpetuates the necessity. As in the human body, the long use of stimulants and opiates demands continually new stimulants and new opiates, so it is with abuses in the institutions of society.—In estimating the probable effects of any new course proposed, we too frequently regard circumstances as they *are*, not as they *would be*, as the change should proceed. The return from a state of disease to a state of health *might* possibly be attended with some apparent exacerbations, but they would be only an effort of nature working her deliverance. Were the means which are employed in sustaining the system of war, employed in establishing and sustaining a different system, the main plea which is urged in its behalf, *self-preservation*, would assume a very different color. The change may require some sacrifice; shall it therefore never be made?

A word on this doctrine of self-preservation. The system of war, *armed* resistance always prepared, I do not say *forcible* resistance—I here say nothing of that subject—is advocated on grounds of necessity. Armies, fleets, magazines, arsenals, forts, navy yards, whatever is comprised within a system of armed resistance, must be maintained by all nations, lest they fall upon and destroy each other. In time of peace, prepare for war, is regarded as a maxim of much political wisdom. You must always be ready for self-defence. Well: but must you always be ready for *armed* defence? Why is it not

* See Report of Con. Peace Society, by Rev. T. H. Gallaudet.

urged upon individuals in civil society to go armed, to labor under arms, to sleep under arms, that they may ever be ready against the cases of imminent peril when necessity annuls the authority of law? Who does not perceive that the cases of necessity, if such a system should be adopted, would rapidly multiply, and soon far exceed in number those contemplated as within the reach of law? Soon the reign of violence would begin, and the voice of law, amid the din of arms, be unheard. *Silent leges inter arma.* Such is the tendency of the system of armed resistance among nations as well as among individuals. It furnishes the means of aggression, and incites to it far more than it provides against it. It ministers to the haughty spirit of independence in man, cherishes his natural impatience of restraint, and sets up his pride and passion above reason and above law. Then, the splendors of the system, the ideas of honor and glory which it involves, inflame the imagination. The pecuniary emoluments which it offers, corrupt the heart; and both together create an interest in exciting national quarrels, independent of the well-being of the state. The very system made to meet the necessity, has induced the necessity more than all other causes united. To induce nations to abandon it, is one great object of peace societies; and if the reign of peace is ever to begin, it is a *practicable* object.

The practicable objects of Peace Societies will be better appreciated by referring to the operations of other benevolent associations. How has the Temperance Reform been so successfully carried forward? Certainly, by addressing public sentiment, and by embodying that sentiment. Facts illustrating the wretchedness of intemperance, the nature of the necessity of intoxicating liquors to the human system, the guilt of those who indulge themselves in its use, and of those who pander for their appetite, have been collected and spread out before the public eye. Associations have been organized in every part of the country, exerting their combined influence in the cause of reform. The pulpit has sounded the alarm and summoned

whatever there is of respectability, virtue, humanity, religion, among men, to the rescue. The medical profession have come forward to exercise their skill, not by applying the virtues of the healing art, but by bearing testimony to the virtue of a favorite maxim of the profession, "Prevention is better than cure." Men of high station have interposed their authority and their name to arrest the progress of the evil. The enterprize, in its advancement has reached the high places of the government, and is spreading a new aspect over some departments of the public service. The genius of the Reform is extending his broad wing over the sacredness of domestic affection and happiness, over the rights of property and of persons, over the public prosperity, over life, and whatever men hold dear, wherever they are to be found, on the ocean or on the land.

Hence let us learn the practicable means of carrying forward the Peace Reform.

The statistics of war, as of intemperance—the simple facts of the case—should be collected and presented to the public eye. The general declamation which has been employed on this subject—the bathetic descriptions of the battle field, of the din of arms, of the clashing steel, of the groans of the wounded and dying, of the spectacle of garments rolled in blood, are worse than worthless. We need simple, well digested statements of the *conditions* of war, drawn up in convenient form, to be disseminated throughout the land, or uttered by the voice of the living lecturer. War is resorted to as a remedy for evils; every proper means of diffusing correct information of the *nature* and *operation* of the remedy, among those for whose benefit it is professedly intended, should be employed.

How long is it since what is now regarded as a poison, was considered as the water of life, and if not possessing the power of conferring the bloom of immortal youth, still as essential to health and strength? How long is it since the cry of *necessity* was raised aloud in favor of a practice now so generally acknowledged to be not only unnecessary, but most noxious? This plea of necessity is the standing plea of those who start up at every noise of reforming the abuses of society. It is a

kind of fastness in the mountains—a desperate retreat to which they fly when driven from the open field, and in its dark recesses, hold out with the tenacity of men who losing them, lose life. In the Temperance Reform, these recesses have been explored and laid open to the light. So it should now be done, and by similar means, in regard to the necessity of war.

Not only is it practicable to diffuse information on the subject of war, and to enlighten public sentiment, but also to embody that sentiment and to cause it to manifest itself in action. What prevents the organization of Peace Societies, as of Temperance Societies, in all parts of the country? But what can these societies, when organized, accomplish? What do the Temperance Societies accomplish? Cannot Peace Societies raise funds as well as Temperance Societies? Can they not embody their sentiments into a creed, and pledge themselves to use all proper means within their power to carry that creed into practice? Can they not express their conviction that:—

“War is incompatible with justice, with morality, with the precepts of the Christian religion, with the progress of that religion; that its splendors are delusion; its glory, disgrace; its trophies, the trophies of ferocity; that it originates in evil dispositions, and is perpetuated by the same; that its necessity is a necessity of the *will*; that in the language adopted by one who “prizes more than honor or than office the power of labouring in those things which concern the best good of mankind*,” it is the greatest of human crimes, that it includes all others, violence, blood, rapine, fraud, every thing which can deform the character, alter the nature and debase the name of man;”—That war is not an appeal to the God of Hosts to dispense justice between the parties, that it bears no analogy to law, human or divine, that it is rather a repeal of law, and a license to the commission of every sort of crime?”

Is it not practicable for individuals holding such opinions, to petition the government to instruct our ambassadors to bring to the notice of foreign courts the subject of substituting some

* Lord Brougham,—Discourse on the present state of the Law.

mode of deciding national disputes according to reason and justice, in place of a mode which only adds to injustice, and *wears out* the dispute for the time being, but never *decides* it. Is it not practicable for individuals, holding such opinions to express them by memorial and petition on every alarm of war? Is it not practicable for National Peace Societies to maintain correspondence with each other, devising modes of operation in concert, collecting facts illustrating the "conditions" of war, communicating them to each other, and on every rumor of war, exerting a simultaneous influence, each on the government of its own country and on its own nation? Is it not a practicable thing to induce legislators, jurists, high officers of the government, and other men of station and influence, to express, like Lord Brougham, their abhorrence of war, as an atrocity not to be endured? If they cannot be induced to go so far as this, can they not be induced to express their opinion that it is utterly inefficient as a mode of redress, that better modes of deciding national differences can be devised, and that the time has come, for humanity to assert her rights, and for reason to claim the exercise of her prerogative? It has not been found impracticable to engage the influence of name and authority in behalf of the Temperance Reform. Is it impracticable to do the same thing in regard to a cause which falls more within the appropriate sphere of public men, with which they are supposed to be better acquainted, and in which their opinion would have greater weight? In fine, is it not a practicable thing, by the force of truth, and of interest rightly understood, to bring men out from under the influence of a custom founded in delusion and in passion?

The idea of *permanent and universal peace*, to many men, presents a state of things too free from imperfection, too exempt from guilt and crime, to be the lot of man on earth. With little reflection, it is despatched almost as soon as suggested, to take its place among the dreams of poets, or the theories of Utopian philosophers. It seems to be overlooked, that there are points *within* this extreme limit, which to gain, is worthy of

the highest effort. It seems to be forgotten that every good thing is reached by a process of approximation, and that the way, though arduous, affords in its course, fruits which abundantly reward the labor of the ascent. The mind glances at the splendor of the work in its completion, and reverts to it, in its humble beginning, with contempt. The origin of an empire laboring under its own greatness, could never have been discerned in the scene of the founder of Rome marking out the limits of the city with a plough.

ARTICLE II.

ANALOGY BETWEEN WAR AND JUDICIAL REDRESS.

THERE is a notion current that the principles of those who would abolish war, imply a virtual abolition of redress of injuries by the civil magistrate. Those who decry war, it seems to be thought, are of the opinion that moral force alone is sufficient to govern the world—an opinion as contrary to Scripture as it is to common sense. The magistrate, it is there said, “beareth not the sword in vain.” Abolish war!—you might as well in civil society cut off the executive arm, demolish every prison, turn loose the robber and the assassin, discard all physical coercion or restraint, and leave the law of the land to sustain its own authority by commending itself to every man’s conscience, whether he has one or not. Thus say those who regard war and judicial force as *one* thing. We propose briefly to see whether they are in fact one or not.

In civil society, the method of obtaining redress of wrongs, or of punishing crime, consists of a series of steps admirably arranged to exclude interest and passion, and to conduct to justice without violating humanity.